

On the Use of Gillian Rose

Abstract: Three recent attempts to draw resources for theology from the work of philosopher and social theorist Gillian Rose are examined. Although her work has received little attention, it has been influential in the development of 'Radical Orthodoxy.' Yet her dense style has led to many misunderstandings of her work. Each of the three attempts to draw theological resources from her work examined is problematic, either because it misrepresents Rose's work or because it reads Rose too narrowly. The outline of a positive account of Rose's philosophy is developed through critical engagements with these three readers. I suggest that an alternative theological appropriation of Rose that focuses on her account of the theological virtues, particularly faith and love, might be possible.

The late Gillian Rose – social theorist, philosopher, scholar of Judaism, Christian convert, and memoirist – is one of those authors whose work many have looked at, few have read, and still fewer have read carefully. This is for many reasons: her dense style, her intertextual argumentation, and her prescience. Who else was not just criticizing but moving beyond French post-structuralism in the heyday of its reception in the English-language world? Perhaps a Badiou or a Žižek, had they come (into English) twenty years earlier, would have suffered the same fate.

It might be the case that the most profound impact Rose had was on theology, though it remains little-examined. When one reads Milbank's *Theology and Social Theory* alongside Rose's *Hegel contra Sociology* or *Dialectic of Nihilism*, one cannot help but be struck by the parallels which run much deeper than the occasional cross-references suggest.¹ Milbank and Rose both argue that the modern world has run afoul and post-structuralist nihilism is no solution. Each shows how the tradition of social theory has gone wrong by supposing that it has its own transcendent foundations and then disavowing any investigation of those foundations.

If the critical projects of Milbank and Rose have much in common, their constructive projects differ greatly. Milbank concludes with a vision of 'ontological peace.' Rose concludes with a call to be content with the difficult and never-ending struggle to grapple with the world we have, not the world we want. In this paper I point to a direction of inquiry into Rose's work which has theological promise but is not presently in circulation. To do this, I will examine the use of Rose in recent work by Tony Gorman, Graham Ward, and Rowan Williams.² Each of these authors attempts to locate a theological dimension in Rose's work. But the Rose of whom Gorman and Ward

write is barely recognizable while the Rose of whom Williams writes is incomplete. The result is that the possibility of a constructive use of Rose to which I want to gesture is obscured.

Tony Gorman has recently discussed the centrality of the concept of 'faith' to Rose's work.³ Focusing particularly on Rose's reading of Kierkegaard in *The Broken Middle*, Gorman attributes to her the view that 'faith in an omnipotent creator is a necessary condition of (being able to) love.'⁴ This strikes me as quite a different Rose than the one I have read. Rose is difficult to read and understand in part because she constructs her arguments by reading others. It seems here that Gorman confuses Kierkegaard's understanding of faith and Rose's.

In the footnote that follows the 'omnipotent creator' text, Gorman quotes Rose as writing, 'only an infinite power can make another free without corrupting itself.'⁵ As Gorman tells us, this line from Rose introduces a long quote from Kierkegaard. In fact, Rose's sentence ends in a colon leading into the quote. This suggests that Rose is not, in fact, writing her own view but rather describing the position expressed in the quotation which she is about to cite.

To take another example, Gorman writes, 'an absolute sense of one's essential desirability can be obtained solely through faith (in an omnipotent, all-loving God). Rose, however, stresses that the God relationship is one that we can never fully achieve but must ever "fail towards".'⁶ Here the reference that Gorman cites is to a passage from *The Broken Middle* discussing Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. Rose suggests that by using pseudonyms, Kierkegaard is problematizing the conventional notion of an 'author,' reminding us that an author is not a single person but multiple voices. She describes this

as '*failing towards form*' (emphasis in original) which is a process 'from the aesthetic to the ethical to the absolute, as the inability to marry; from the absolute to the ethical to the aesthetic, as the inability to write without arrogating illegitimate authority.'⁷

This passage has nothing whatsoever to do with Rose's belief in 'an omnipotent, all-loving God.' That belief is Kierkegaard's. Rather, Rose's text has to do with the relationship between Kierkegaard's biography (his inability to marry, his pseudonyms) and the style and substance of his writing. The first chain leads from 'the aesthetic' (Kierkegaard's writing, its style) to 'the ethical' (the ethical implications that the writing advances) to 'the absolute' (failure in worldly matters, in the leap to love / the leap to God). The second chain leads in the opposite direction, from an absolute (in)decision to the realm of writing: because a decision was not taken in the world, Kierkegaard can no longer write with one voice. Rose concludes from this process, 'If this dual-directional approach is sustainable and sustained, a 'third' will emerge: the law revealed and concealed in the absence of *gravitas* – no marriage – and in the absence of grace – no silence – only poetry. The one thing needful is to bear this suspense – this anxiety – of beginning.'⁸

Rose is showing how, through reading Kierkegaard's biography and philosophy, her main idea, the 'broken middle,' is revealed. This middle is the realm of 'law,' by which Rose means the social practices and institutions which compose our world. Rose's thesis is that philosophy tends to obfuscate this middle, it tends to posit certain concepts as transcendent so that they cannot be further investigated: they are absolute. The middle is broken because it is always in error: institutions and practices are always imperfect; they always do some amount of harm. In the absence of an absolute, the way we react to

what is left, to the ‘broken middle,’ is with anxiety. This is the point of her engagement with Kierkegaard: to recover his notion of anxiety and to assign it to the middle.⁹

There is no reason to think, as Gorman does, that Rose adopts Kierkegaard’s faith in God. For him to write of ‘Rose’s defense of Kierkegaard’s fideism and the adoption of the Judaic model of polity over the classical Greek polis’ is precisely wrong.¹⁰ Rose writes explicitly of her opposition *both* to ‘Athens’ (the Greek polis) *and* to ‘Jerusalem’ (the Judaic model of polity). In the case of Athens, on her reading, the existing law is taken as transcendent, unquestionable. In the case of Jerusalem, all law is opposed in order to follow the direct word of God which is taken as transcendent, unquestionable. Instead of either city, Rose calls on us to critically engage with the world as it is, not to accept it or to seek to escape it.¹¹

Further, Gorman suggests that faith is central to that other central element of Rose’s conceptual vocabulary: love. On his account, Rose thinks that ‘faith is a necessary condition of love without domination’ and that ‘For Rose, the way to nature (love) is through God (the Law as Revelation).’¹² But Rose is harshly critical of all accounts of ‘Law as Revelation;’ indeed, she identifies this move as the typical ‘diremption’ that characterizes both modern and post-modern thought (i.e., all thought which is not truly Hegelian).¹³ If law is revelation it cannot be critically examined. We cannot do the difficult work of the middle. Love does have to do with law, but only as an intensification of the ordinary practice of grappling with law. There is ‘violence in love’ and ‘love in violence’ ‘because the law is in both.’¹⁴ Love is a ‘riskful engagement’ and involves negotiating boundaries between oneself and others, knowing that we will get love wrong yet continuing to do ‘love’s work.’¹⁵

So what *does* Rose think about faith? Confining ourselves to *The Broken Middle*, and to Rose's engagement with Kierkegaard therein, the clearest statement of her position is in her discussion of the story of the sacrifice of Isaac. Here Rose does assent to the Kierkegaardian notion of a 'suspension' of the ethical, yet her understanding of this concept is in line with her larger project and not Kierkegaard's. The suspension of the ethical is the 'witness of Abraham and of the reader' which is the 'movement of faith.' One knows that one is always already embedded in the world, in the law, in violence. But it is only with faith that one can avoid 'becoming an arbitrary perpetrator or an arbitrary victim.'¹⁶ This is because in faith one is 'willing to stake oneself.'

Admittedly Rose leaves this, her understanding of agency as rooted in faith, opaque and underdeveloped. But it seems to be roughly this: that the possibility of standing back from the ethical, from the law, for a moment, allows one to exercise agency, to stake oneself. But this is paradoxical because there is no moment 'outside' the law, outside social reality, and so faith cannot be justified in terms of law.¹⁷ Faith is what makes the middle 'difficult': it is to see the middle as 'broken' (violent) and to grapple with that difficulty, to put oneself at risk in that treacherous terrain rather than becoming an arbitrary perpetrator or victim. Yet, at the end of the day, faith remains indescribable.

If Gorman tries to read Rose closely but becomes lost in a tangle of intertextuality, Graham Ward invokes Rose as a name to support a project from which she would most certainly dissent. Further, Ward fails to grapple with Rose's explicit criticism of a view very similar to his own.

Rose's name is invoked three times in Ward's *Christ and Culture*. First, Ward suggests that Barth,

‘attempts ... not to *maintain* the contradiction but to bear its rupture’. In other words, Barth’s Christology is a negotiation of what Gillian Rose called ‘the broken middle’ in terms of a unique person (Jesus Christ). What I am attempting in these essays is to see how in and across this broken middle there is constructed a set of relations, a divine and dynamic operation that constitutes an embodiment (the body of Christ, the body of the Church, the sacramental body, the social body and the physical bodies of each of us).¹⁸

Here, Rose is at least recognizable. She does, indeed, argue that there is a ‘contradiction’ (more specifically, a ‘diremption,’) in modernity and post-modernity, and she does not think that it should be ignored or falsely resolved. By doing the difficult work of thinking through the contradiction, the brokenness of the middle, we ‘bear its rupture.’ But Ward’s declaration of his relationship to Rose’s project is ambiguous: by disclosing a ‘set of relations’ ‘in and across this broken middle,’ does he purport to continue to ‘bear its rupture’ (i.e., to continue Rose’s project)? Or does he attempt to resolve the contradiction (i.e., to oppose Rose’s project)?

The next of Ward’s references to Rose is in his discussion of feminist theory. Ward associates Irigaray’s work with Rose’s: Irigaray’s move away from ‘disembodied consciousness’ is associated with ‘the broken middle.’¹⁹ In a footnote, Ward concedes that Rose is much more Hegelian than Irigaray and describes the argument of *The Broken Middle* as follows: ‘Rose defends the thesis that the “broken middle” is the site of the sacred.’²⁰ It seems as though Ward wants to align himself with Rose, both in identifying a problematic (‘the contradiction’) and a solution (‘to bear its rupture’ which he

associates with operating in ‘the site of the sacred’). Ward goes on to seemingly clinch this identification of the middle with the site of the sacred: ‘[Rose] ends her book memorably with a move towards negative theology: ‘The more the middle is dirempted the more it becomes sacred in ways that configure its further diremption’.’²¹

At first glance, this quotation sounds quite convincing. As there is more and more diremption in the middle (splitting, contradiction, rupture...), it is more and more ‘sacred’ – which is good (or, for the atheist, at least comforting), leading to more and more diremption, and so on. But this gives Rose’s words exactly the opposite sense of how they are used in context.

The passage cited by Ward follows a section of *The Broken Middle* titled, ‘New Jerusalem Old Athens: The Holy Middle.’²² The point of this section is to explore recent Christian and Jewish attempts to evade the difficult work of the middle while claiming its authority. As Rose writes of such attempts, ‘they resonate with and claim to do justice to the unequivocal middle.’²³ The middle is unequivocal for these writers because it is outside the law. But this is paradoxical because the middle is, by definition, equivocal; it is the realm of the (necessarily violent) law. The strategy of these Jewish and Christian writers is to claim that the middle is ‘holy,’ yet ‘[t]his holiness corrupts.’²⁴ The claim of holiness blinds us to the ‘systematically flawed’ institutions that compose the social world; it leads us to call for their elimination or perfection. Instead, Rose calls for ‘investigation’ of the middle, for it to be ‘thought systematically’ rather than to be evaded by being ‘sacralized.’²⁵

This is the context which leads to the text which Ward cites about further diremption leading the middle to become more sacred. ‘Diremption’ is not a term of

praise for Rose. It is the term she uses to characterize neo-Kantian philosophy which has separated law from an uninvestigated transcendent that authorizes it.²⁶ And, as we have just seen, the ‘holy’ and ‘sacred’ are also not terms of praise. Like ‘diremption,’ they represent evasions of the investigation of the law itself. With this context in mind, Rose’s words take on quite a different meaning: ‘These forced reconciliations of diremption in the “new” forms of civil immediacy and holy mediation sanctify specific violence as they seek to surpass violence in general. The more the middle is dirempted the more it becomes sacred in ways that configure its further diremption.’²⁷ Rose is writing of a spiraling away from law of which she disapproves, which she finds to be violent. The middle is not the site of the sacred; the rhetoric of the sacred evades the middle.

Ward’s final reference to Rose in *Christ and Culture* is the most perplexing. He writes that allegory

is also a strategy for the disruption of geographical space, installing a deliberate obfuscation of spatial dimensions. A sacred space is opened, what Gillian Rose has called the ‘broken middle’. This is a space which is constantly transgressing its own dimensions, a space that cannot be located ‘here’ or ‘there’ because it is a space that cannot be contained, a space that deconstructs its boundaries... This space can neither be limited nor defined.²⁸

Here Ward is doing more than simply identifying ‘the middle’ with a ‘sacred’ space. He is describing its further attributes: it cannot be contained or described, it does not have a fixed physical location, it is constantly in flux. This does not sound at all like

‘the middle’ of *The Broken Middle*. The ‘work’ of that middle is to describe it, to try to understand it knowing that our concepts are inadequate. However, this middle does sound quite like the description of space in Gillian Rose’s *Feminism and Geography* – a book not cited in *Christ and Culture* but which is referred to in Ward’s earlier *Cities of God*.²⁹ In *Feminism and Geography*, Rose writes that space is ‘multidimensional, shifting, contingent.’ Further, in that work Rose suggests that ‘spaces that would be mutually exclusive if charted on a two-dimensional map – centre and margin, inside and outside – are occupied simultaneously.’³⁰

Rose further develops this understanding of space, which she understands to be ‘feminist,’ by contrasting ‘transparent’ spaces associated with ‘imperialism’ which marginalize difference with fluid, ‘fragmented,’ and ‘provisional’ spaces.³¹ In an examination of community arts projects in Edinburgh published in 1997, Rose suggested that community artists create oppositional ‘diasporic understandings of “community”’ by understanding ‘community’ not in a solely spatial sense but also including groups with shared interests as communities. Moreover, ‘community’ is articulated, is performed; its contents are ‘never pre-given.’ On Rose’s view, the community of arts workers ‘performs a ... critical anti-essentializing.’³²

The problem, however, is that in 1997 the brilliant philosopher Gillian Rose was not immersing herself in the arts community of Edinburgh. Rather, she was, as we say in Middle America, pushing up daisies.³³ Was this a posthumous article? No. To solve the riddle: Gertrude Stein notwithstanding, there are two Roses who not only share a first and last name but share overlapping interests in post-structuralist theory, architecture, and

urban planning. Or, rather, there were two Roses: extant Rose presently teaches at Open University; deceased Rose remains deceased.

This observation is not meant to be maliciously directed at Professor Ward: the slippage between the two Roses could quite possibly be unconscious and is at any rate certainly understandable.³⁴ What is interesting about disaggregating the two Roses is to appreciate the critique that the late Rose levels at positions held by Ward and ‘Radical Orthodoxy.’ The late Rose makes a persuasive case against these positions by arguing that there is a convergence between the views of ‘post-Christian’ thinkers such as Mark C. Taylor and ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ thinkers such as John Milbank.

Both Taylor and Milbank ‘offer Christian New Jerusalem for old Athens,’ according to the late Rose.³⁵ Both authors attempt to return theology – or atheology – to its position as ‘queen of the sciences,’ subordinating social theory, architecture, and cultural studies in general to its regime. Taylor advocates a ‘Dionysian joy,’ an ‘eternal play of the divine milieu’ that ‘breaks the power of law’ and is never at rest. Milbank’s transformation of ‘transcendental difference’ into ‘harmonic peace’ by means of the Christian perspective constructs an Augustinian alternative city ‘beyond even the violence of legality.’ Taylor’s vision is Protestant, Milbank’s is Catholic, but they both envision holy cities which are antinomian, outside the realm of the law. Both refuse the broken middle.

Although Rose suggests that there is a structural similarity between the works of Taylor and Milbank, this is all the more true when the comparison is between Taylor and Ward.³⁶ Indeed, it seems as though Taylor and Ward are looking at the same glass, just disagreeing as to whether it is half-empty or half-full. In *Christ and Culture*, Ward

criticizes Taylor for holding that ‘reality is textual’ without ‘the allegorical depth and transcendent significance of the Word enfolding all our words.’³⁷ Ward describes the ‘textuality’ embraced by Taylor as ‘all surface, simulacra, façade.’ But it is difficult to see how Ward’s alternative to ‘textuality’ – ‘mimesis’ and ‘narrative’ founded in Christ – is more than a switched label.

Ward argues that the difference between himself and Taylor is that we are ‘inscribed’ within the Christian narrative, the story of our relationship with Father, Son, and Spirit, ‘caught by the power of the story-telling.’³⁸ So it would seem that the ‘narrative’ and ‘mimesis’ Ward advocates differ from ‘textuality’ by their involvement with the Christian story. But in Ward’s reading of the Christian story, for example in his commentary on a passage from the gospel of Mark, it is hard to determine the uniquely Christian features. ‘At the “end” as in the “beginning” there is a question about origins and authorship. And the final “ending” is deferred and doubled.’³⁹ Moreover, he writes that mimesis ‘functions through mirroring – repetition that creates significances and, by associating one object or event with another, opens up alternative readings.’⁴⁰ If the story which is supposed to anchor meaning is itself ‘textual,’ as Ward’s description of the Christian story sounds, it is unclear what substantive disagreement there is between Taylor and Ward. Put another way, if Ward wants to avoid being lumped with Taylor as an ‘a/theologian,’ he must directly address the challenge posed by the *late* Gillian Rose.

Rowan Williams’ own theological thought is perhaps the most closely aligned with Rose’s philosophy.⁴¹ So it is not surprising that when he directly addresses Rose’s philosophy, the Rose that emerges appears much more recognizable than the Rose that emerges from the work of Gorman or Ward. Williams emphasizes human fallibility, the

constant error that characterizes ‘our position towards others and towards ourselves.’⁴² There is no final synthesis, no culminating point or worldly New Jerusalem of perfect recognition which can be reached. Rather, ‘every moment of recognition is also a new moment of salutary error.’⁴³ To act ethically, for Williams’ Rose, is to renounce the possibility of a final true judgment yet not to renounce the possibility of acting. It is to act knowing that one will act in error yet to continue acting.

Williams is careful to separate his reading of Rose, herself, from his own ‘theological coda’ to her work which addresses the possible application of her work to Christian theology. The theological opening that Williams identifies in Rose’s work is faithful to the spirit of her work: it is not in a ‘mending’ of the middle but rather in the difficult negotiation of the middle that religion might enter, according to Williams. As he writes, it is ‘not the facile and tempting question of law’s relation to grace, but the harder one of how the very experience of learning and of negotiation can be read as something to do with God.’⁴⁴ Rose teaches that there are no shortcuts; there are is no direct, unmediated relationship with the Other. There is only the ‘painful job’ of understanding the Other and myself in our relationship with each other.

Specifically, Williams suggests that Rose’s work points to an understanding of God as having ‘supreme disinterestedness.’ He recognizes the treacherous path that such a position walks: it is tempting for an understanding of the disinterestedness of God to lead to a total detachment of human communities and history from a relationship with the divine. Yet this notion of supreme disinterestedness recognizes that Christians’ ‘perception of their interest is as flawed and liable to violence as any other’s, but who understand their fundamental task as embodying the “non-interest” of God, the universal

saving generosity of divine action.⁴⁵ This generosity is kenosis, not a displacement from God to history but history as simultaneously other than God and enactment of divine life. It is God 'living in its other, realizing its "interest" in its other'.⁴⁶

The theological implications that Williams and Ward draw from Rose are nearly opposite. While both understand 'the middle' as the site about which theology speaks, for Ward, something positive can be said about the middle. It is anchored (better: sanctified) by its relation to the specific individual, Jesus Christ. Williams' theology here is negative: God does not mend the middle but echoes its brokenness. We cannot think or speak about God except as absence, an absence which reminds us of our imperfection and encourages us not to give up the work of witness.

Although Williams' suggestions about the possible theological appropriation of Rose seem reasonable, they also are limited. What has happened to Rose's deep engagement with the theological virtues, particularly with faith and love? Williams reads Rose's work as 'between metaphysics and politics,' yet might there not be more that can be said? Williams, like Ward, is accepting Rose's problematic: the unavoidability of the difficult work of the broken middle. But where Ward wants to mend the middle, Williams, like Rose, wants to remain content with it. This may be all Rose says 'metaphysically,' but she says much more practically – about faith and love. Williams has focused his theological recovery of Rose on metaphysics and not on ethics, and particularly not on the theological virtues.

In conclusion, I would just like to gesture towards the constructive use of Rose which I think is possible once the confusions and obfuscations discussed above are cleared away. Rose offers an alternative to the secular colonization of the sacred and the

theological colonization of the secular. After identifying the transcendent presuppositions on which modernity and post-modernity are founded, Rose urges us to investigate those presuppositions rather than to ignore, abandon, or to offer alternatives to them. Instead of a worldly New Jerusalem to rescue us from the fallenness of the world as it is, Rose suggests that we cultivate the theological virtues, particularly faith and love.⁴⁷ These virtues are practiced within, not outside, the law. I suspect that a fuller investigation of Rose's understanding of the theological virtues would be highly fruitful.

¹ John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Gillian Rose, *Hegel contra Sociology* (London: Athlone, 1981); Gillian Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-structuralism and Law* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

² I do not examine Milbank's use of Rose here because his is a more complicated case, because Rose directly engages with Milbank (as will be discussed below), and because many of Milbank's concerns are aligned with those of Ward.

³ Tony Gorman, 'Nihilism and Faith: Rose, Bernstein and the Future of Critical Theory,' *Radical Philosophy*, November-December 2005, Number 134, pp. 18-30; c.f., Tony Gorman, 'Gillian Rose and the Project of a Critical Marxism,' January-February 2001, *Radical Philosophy*, Number 105, pp. 25-36.

⁴ Gorman, 'Nihilism and Faith,' p. 21.

⁵ Ibid, p. 28n20, quoting Gillian Rose, *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 82.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 21-22.

⁷ Rose, *The Broken Middle*, p. 53.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Certainly Gorman does attribute to Rose a position something like this at points. For example: 'the education of faith necessarily involves negotiating the always-already historically contingent but prevailing forms of political and legal authority' ('Nihilism and Faith,' p. 23).

¹⁰ Gorman, 'Nihilism and Faith,' p. 27.

¹¹ See, for example, 'Athens and Jerusalem: A Tale of Three Cities' in Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 15-39.

¹² Gorman, 'Nihilism and Faith,' p. 18 and 25.

¹³ See Rose, *Dialectic of Nihilism*.

¹⁴ Rose, *The Broken Middle*, p. 148.

¹⁵ Gillian Rose, *Love's Work: A Reckoning with Life* (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), pp. 71, 105-6.

¹⁶ Rose, *The Broken Middle*, p. 148.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Graham Ward, *Christ and Culture*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 22.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 148.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 148n72.

²¹ Ibid, quoting Rose, *The Broken Middle* p. 307 and referring the reader to Rowan Williams' article on Rose, discussed below.

²² These are not the words that 'end' her book; they are the words that conclude the penultimate chapter. The end of the book is, significantly, 'The middle will then show: rended not mended, it continues to pulsate, ancient and broken heart of modernity, old and new, West and East.' Rose, *The Broken Middle*, p. 310.

²³ Rose, *The Broken Middle*, p. 284.

²⁴ Ibid, p. 284.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 293.

²⁶ See her *Dialectic of Nihilism*.

²⁷ *The Broken Middle*, p. 307.

²⁸ Ward, *Christ and Culture*, p. 240.

²⁹ Graham Ward, *Cities of God*, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 56.

³⁰ Gillian Rose, *Feminism and Geography: The Limits of Geographical Knowledge*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p. 140.

³¹ Alison Blunt and Gillian Rose, 'Introduction: Women's Colonial and Postcolonial Geographies,' in Alison Blunt and Gillian Rose (eds.), *Writing Women and Space: Colonial and Postcolonial Geographies*, (New York: The Guilford Press, 1994), pp. 7-8, 19.

³² Gillian Rose, 'Spatialities of 'Community', Power and Change: The Imagined Geographies of Community Projects,' *Cultural Studies*, January 1997, Volume 11, Number 1, p. 4.

³³ Rose died on December 9, 1995.

³⁴ A former colleague of mine wrote a dissertation chapter cleverly linking Rose's Judaism and her feminist geography only to learn of this subtle diremption of identity. Incidentally, Jacqueline Rose, the literature scholar, is the sister of the late Gillian Rose. To be clear: *Feminism and Geography* and the two papers cited in footnotes 31 and 32 were written by extant Rose, all other works cited are written by the late Rose.

³⁵ Gillian Rose, *The Broken Middle*, p. 278. cf, Gillian Rose, 'Shadow of Spirit' in *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 37-51.

³⁶ Indeed, I think that Milbank has a powerful counter to Rose's criticism in his notion of 'complex space.' See the essay of this title in John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

³⁷ Ward, *Christ and Culture*, p. 195.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

⁴¹ See, for example, his essays collected in *On Christian Theology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).

⁴² Rowan Williams, 'Between Politics and Metaphysics: Reflections in the Wake of Gillian Rose,' *Modern Theology*, January 1995, Volume 11, Number 1, p. 9.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Rose condemns advocates of New Age medicine as 'enchiridions of Faith, Hope, and Love' but I do not think this signals a general opposition to the theological virtues. She goes on to write of New Age medicine as that which 'would condemn you to seek blissful, deathless, cosmic emptiness – the repose without the revel,' definitely not the (Rose-ian) understanding of the theological virtues which I am gesturing to here. *Love's Work*, p. 106.